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The platform

The Veync Engine

An autonomous adversary that plans, executes and verifies attacker actions against your environment — confined to a scope you authorize, and recording exactly what proved each result.

Autonomous adversary fabric

Agents that plan and chain actions, not scripts that replay them

A scenario library can only exercise what someone already wrote down. Veync's agents reason about your environment, chain actions across layers, and adapt when a step fails — which is where undetected paths are found.

  1. 01

    Planning and execution

    A planner decomposes an objective into candidate paths, then reconnaissance, exploitation and AI-layer agents execute them and feed results back so the next step is chosen from what actually happened.

    Failure is signal: a blocked step narrows the search rather than ending the run.

  2. 02

    Confinement, not best effort

    Every action is checked against the authorized scope before it executes, so autonomy never means unbounded reach. The boundary is enforced in the control plane, not inside the agents it governs.

    An agent cannot widen its own scope, because it is not the component that holds it.

  3. 03

    Proof, not narration

    Each executed action is recorded with its inputs, its result and the artefacts it produced, so a verdict carries its own justification rather than a summary written afterwards.

    Any finding can be re-read, re-run and compared with a later run.

  4. 04

    Re-run on change

    Validation re-runs when the system changes rather than on a calendar, so a verdict describes the configuration you are running rather than the one you were running last quarter.

    A new agent, tool permission or detection change is a trigger, not a note for next year.

Architecture

Four layers, and the boundary between them

The operator authorizes. The control plane confines. The agents execute. The evidence layer records. Separating them is what makes autonomous offensive testing safe enough to run against a production estate.

Four layers. The operator defines rules of engagement. The control plane holds those rules, enforces scope, and provides a kill switch. Adversary agents — a planner, reconnaissance, exploitation, an AI-layer adversary and a verifier — execute only what the control plane permits. The evidence layer records an audit trail and builds the evidence graph from verified results.

  1. Operator

    • Operator
  2. Control plane

    • Rules of engagement
    • Scope enforcer
    • Kill switch
  3. Adversary agents

    • Planner
    • Reconnaissance
    • Exploitation
    • AI adversary
    • Verifier
  4. Evidence

    • Audit trail
    • Evidence graph

Authorization control plane

The part you should audit first

Autonomous offensive tooling is only acceptable if its limits are structural. These are the five invariants the control plane holds, and the component that holds each one.

Nothing executes outside the agreed scope
Targets, networks, identities, tenants and agent endpoints are enumerated before a run and checked on every action. An action against anything not on the list is refused and logged.Enforced byScope enforcer
Rules of engagement are machine-readable
Permitted techniques, excluded systems, time windows and escalation paths are configuration rather than a PDF, so the run cannot drift from what was signed.Enforced byRules of engagement
Blast radius is bounded in advance
Destructive and high-impact classes of action are off by default and enabled only per engagement, with a ceiling on concurrency and on changes to any single system.Enforced byScope enforcer
A single stop that actually stops
One control halts planning, in-flight execution and queued work, and revokes the credentials issued for the run. It is exercised as part of onboarding rather than assumed.Enforced byKill switch
Every action is attributable
Each executed action records who authorized it, which rule permitted it, when it ran and what it touched, so your own SOC can reconcile Veync activity against real attacker activity.Enforced byAudit trail

None of these are agent-side behaviours. An agent asks the control plane whether an action is permitted and receives an answer; it has no path to the decision.

Evidence graph

A verdict that carries its own proof

The difference between a finding and an assertion is traceability. Every verdict in Veync resolves back through the artefacts that produced it to the exact action that was executed.

  1. 01

    Executed action

    The concrete step an agent took, with its parameters, its timestamp and the scope rule that permitted it.

  2. 02

    Artefact

    What the action produced: a response, a transcript, a session, a written file, a telemetry record or its absence.

  3. 03

    Verdict

    The judgement the artefacts support — prevented, detected, alerted or missed — with the reasoning retained rather than summarised away.

  4. 04

    Obligation

    The control, framework clause or regulatory obligation the verdict speaks to, so the evidence is usable in an audit without translation.

This is also what makes a re-run meaningful: because a verdict is anchored to an action, the same action can be replayed after remediation and the two results compared directly.

Continuous operation

A verdict has a shelf life

An assessment describes a configuration at a moment. Estates change continuously, and the changes that matter most to detection are routine enough that nobody reports them.

What triggers a re-run

  • A new agent or tool permission
  • A model or provider change
  • A detection rule edit
  • A control upgrade or policy change
  • A new exclusion
  • An identity or tenant change
  • A new external service
  • A published technique worth exercising

The practical effect is that the question changes from "when was this last tested" to "has anything changed since it was last proved" — which is the question a board can actually act on.

Deployment

Three deployment models

The constraint is usually not technical but contractual: where evidence may be stored and who may hold the credentials. All three models run the same engine and produce the same evidence.

Deployment models compared across residency, execution, evidence storage and access
DimensionManaged (EU)Private cloudSelf-hosted
Data residencyEU regions onlyYour tenant, your regionYour infrastructure
Agent executionVeync-operatedYour tenant, Veync-operatedYour operators
Evidence storageVeync, EU-hostedYour tenantYour storage
Credential custodyScoped, issued per runScoped, issued per runNever leaves your estate
IntegrationSIEM, ticketing, SSOSIEM, ticketing, SSOSIEM, ticketing, SSO
Typical onboardingFastestModerateLongest

Data residency

EU-hosted by default

Validation evidence is a detailed map of where your defences fail. It is among the most sensitive data you will ever hand to a vendor, and it is treated accordingly.

EU data residency
Processed and stored in the EU
Evidence, telemetry and run records stay in EU regions. There is no replication to a non-EU region for convenience.
Named access only
Access is restricted to named personnel on your engagement, logged, and revoked when the engagement ends.
Retention you set
Retention is contractual rather than default, with deletion on request and a certificate of destruction.
Disclosed subprocessors
The subprocessor list is part of the agreement and changes are notified, not discovered.

Lawful use

Authorization is the first control

Offensive capability without written authorization is not a product, it is a liability. This posture is not a disclaimer at the bottom of the page; it is the reason the control plane exists.

What is agreed before a run

  • The accountable owner who authorizes the engagement
  • The enumerated systems, identities and agent endpoints in scope
  • The systems explicitly excluded
  • Permitted and prohibited technique classes
  • Time windows and concurrency ceilings
  • The escalation path and named contacts
  • Evidence handling, residency and retention
  • The conditions under which the run is stopped

Validation modules

What the engine validates

Seven modules, one engine. Each answers a question a board can ask and an auditor can follow.

Questions

What engineering teams ask

How do you stop an autonomous agent exceeding its scope?

Scope is not an agent-side behaviour. Every action is checked against the authorized scope by the control plane before it executes, and an agent has no path to that decision — it receives a permitted or refused answer. Refusals are logged alongside executed actions.

What happens if something goes wrong mid-run?

A single kill switch halts planning, in-flight execution and queued work, and revokes the credentials issued for the run. It is exercised during onboarding rather than assumed to work, and the escalation path and named contacts are agreed before the first run.

Will this generate noise in our SOC?

It should, and that is part of the measurement. Every executed action is attributable, so your team can reconcile Veync activity against real activity afterwards. Whether your detections fired at all is one of the outputs.

Can we run it ourselves?

Yes. The self-hosted model keeps execution, evidence and credentials entirely inside your estate, with your operators running the engine. It takes the longest to onboard and produces the same evidence as the managed model.

Where does our evidence live?

In EU regions by default, with named access only, contractual retention, deletion on request and a disclosed subprocessor list. In the private-cloud and self-hosted models it never leaves your tenant or your infrastructure at all.

See the engine against your environment

A validation briefing walks through your estate, the scope we would authorize, the deployment model that fits your constraints, and the evidence you would receive.

Named-vendor results and control-evasion evidence are shared under NDA, through the evidence annex.